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Final-USIB-Approved
Conclusions to
USIB-D-24.7/3 (SC-11879-65)
28 October 1965
Limited Distribution

CONCLUSIONS

A. The largest quantities of manpower and supplies for the Viet Cong are obtained within South Vietnam. The Viet Cong have developed an effective logistic system which procures from internal sources almost all the supplies used by the Viet Cong. Important military materiel unavailable locally is obtained from external sources.

B. The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam is responsible for providing funds for the Viet Cong war effort. Taxation, economic activities, seizure, and clandestine operations appear to be the principal means of obtaining financial and material support for the Viet Cong. Funds acquired internally are supplemented by those obtained from Communist countries.

C. Within South Vietnam the Viet Cong transportation system and network of supply bases are indispensable to the operations of their forces at anything approaching the present level of military activity. The volume of supplies moving internally and the total stockpile in the supply bases cannot be determined from present evidence. Internal distribution of infiltrated supplies and transportation of locally procured goods require

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about 14,000 personnel, exclusive of enforced labor, on a full-time basis. Supply depots normally have a nominal capacity of from 5 to 10 tons of supplies and while usually containing mixed classes of supplies, some contain only weapons and ammunition, and some handle food exclusively. The fragmentation of storage areas is a basic constraint on the rapid initiation of large-scale Viet Cong actions.

D. The Viet Cong are increasingly dependent on outside sources for arms and ammunition, certain technical equipment, medical supplies, cadre personnel, and trained technicians. These move into South Vietnam via three principal routes, as follows:

1. The Laotian corridor, which is continuously being improved, is the principal route for the movement of personnel and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Supplies moved over this route are destined primarily for the northern and central highland areas. The Communists have developed the logistical troops and organization to control and operate this route. As of mid-1964, an estimated 1,700 to 2,000 men were maintaining the transportation corridor through Laos and

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another 3,000 or more were maintaining the route in the northern part of South Vietnam.

2. The sea route from North Vietnam is probably being used less at this time, although it played an important part in stocking the supply bases in the southern and coastal parts of the country. The use of alternative routes for maintaining stocks of military materiel in these areas has not been detected.

3. Some supplies for the Viet Cong have entered South Vietnam from Cambodia. Most of the supplies are either indigenous to Cambodia or arrived through normal trade channels, but some have probably moved in clandestine channels. Cambodia is also used by the Viet Cong as a sanctuary and for temporary military facilities. The Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory is due to active Cambodian cooperation in some areas, a laissez-faire attitude in others, and the inability or failure of the Cambodian government to control or even patrol its frontiers. The Cambodian government has taken an attitude increasingly favorable to the Communists in the Vietnamese situation, but has stopped short of

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military support.

E. From 1959 through September 1965, about 48,000 personnel are believed to have infiltrated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, including units of regular PAVN forces. Although it is impossible to compute the total amount of supplies available for infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam, it appears that the daily average thus far during 1965 has been at least 5 tons and may have been more than 8 tons. These amounts, primarily delivered by truck into Laos in the past dry season, may have been supplemented by additional supplies moved by porters and other means of transport. The additional amounts cannot be quantified. We have also been unable to determine comparable figures for the sea route from North Vietnam and the land and water routes from Cambodia. However, what evidence there is leads to the conclusion that the tonnages moving over these latter routes are significantly less than the tonnage moving through Laos.

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